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Abstract
In federated learning systems, clients are autonomous in that their behaviors are
not fully governed by the server. Consequently, a client may intentionally or
unintentionally deviate from the prescribed course of federated model training,
resulting in abnormal behaviors, such as turning into a malicious attacker or a
malfunctioning client. Timely detecting those anomalous clients is therefore critical
to minimize their adverse impacts. In this work, we propose to detect anomalous
clients at the server side. In particular, we generate low-dimensional surrogates of
model weight vectors and use them to perform anomaly detection. We evaluate
our solution through experiments on image classification model training over
FEMNIST dataset. Experimental results show that the proposed detection-based
approach significantly outperforms the conventional defense-based methods.
1 Introduction
Federated learning, first proposed by Google in [1, 2], is a new paradigm that enables multiple data
owners (a.k.a. clients) to collaboratively train a machine learning model without sharing their privacy-
sensitive data on a server. The federated setting is a natural fit for distributed multi-task learning [3].
Thanks to its potential for ensuring privacy, federated learning has already found its applications in
various fields, such as mobile internet, finance, insurance, healthcare and smart cities [4–6].
In a typical horizontal federated learning system [1, 2, 4], there is one server and multiple clients.
Each client performs model training using its own data and transfers local update to the server for
aggregation. The aggregated model update (a.k.a. global update) is then pulled back from the server
by the clients. This training process repeats iteratively until the model converges or the maximum
number of training rounds is reached. In such a federated setting, the federated averaging (FedAvg)
algorithm is widely-used for federated model training, which takes either the model average or the
gradient average of the local model weight or gradient updates from the clients [2, 7–10].
In contrast to its counterpart in distributed machine learning system, the server in a federated learning
system has no access to the clients’ data, nor does it have a full control of the clients’ behaviors. As a
consequence, a client may deviate from the normal behaviors during the course of federated learning,
which is originally called Byzantine attacks and is referred to as abnormal client behavior in this
work. Abnormal client behavior may be caused intentionally, e.g., by a malicious attacker disguised
as a normal client, or unintentionally, e.g., by a client with hardware and/or software defects. It is
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important to detect such abnormal clients, so as to: (i) minimize the impact of anomalous clients;
(ii) report abnormal clients; (iii) avoid model leakage to unintended clients; and (iv) prevent from
allocating reward or incentive to abnormal clients [11]. Traditional Byzantine-tolerant algorithms are
defense-based and sometimes fall short in the federated learning settings with accuracies deteriorated
as demonstrated in our experiments. The crux of performance degradation is due to the untargeted
defense adopted in existing methods, defending against the attackers at a cost of honest clients.
In this work, we propose a new approach that leverages a pre-trained anomaly detection model
to detect abnormal client behaviors and eliminate their adverse impacts. We employ an anomaly
detection model at the server to run over the local model weight updates received from the clients.
We apply FedAvg algorithm [2] to aggregate the model weight updates. Our approach widely applies
to scenarios where the model weight update is sent from a client to the server in various manners,
e.g., with no encryption [2], with additive masking protection [12], with differential privacy [13, 14],
and in a trusted execution environment (TEE) [15]. Since the model weight of a deep learning model
can easily be oversized, we utilize dimensionality reduction techniques to generate surrogates of
the local model weight updates at the server for anomaly detection. Experimental results show that
the proposed detection-based approach outperforms the conventional defense-based methods, e.g.,
achieving an improvement of 10% or more in model accuracy for the jointly trained model.
2 Related Work
Defending against malicious attackers has been extensively studied in the context of distributed
machine learning, e.g., popular defense-based methods including GeoMed [16], Krum [17], and
Trimmed Mean [18]. For federated learning, there also exist several defense-based schemes for
minimizing the impact of malicious attackers, such as the work of [19]. The authors of [20] proposed
a detection-based approach for collaborative machine learning. The work of [20] is based on the
assumption that the distribution of the masked features of the training data preserves the distribution
of the training data, which is, however, not applicable to federated learning. To our knowledge, this is
the first work that applies a detection-based approach to the federated learning framework.
3 Abnormal Client Behavior Detection
3.1 Problem Definition
We consider a horizontal federated learning system consisting of one server and K clients that
collaboratively train a model using the FedAvg algorithm [2]. Due to space limit, we only present the
case where each client sends local model weight update to the server without encryption, while leaving
the case with additive masking [12], differential privacy [13, 14], and targeted model poisoning [21,
22] to the full version of this work. Our goal is to use an anomaly detection model at the server to
detect the anomalous clients and to eliminate their impact on federated model training.
3.2 The Detection-Based Approach
The key idea of our detection-based approach is that each client in the federated learning system is
assigned a credit score, which is calculated based on the anomaly score produced by the anomaly
detection model. Assuming K clients participate in federated learning, each client has a number of
nk training data points and a local model weight wkt+1 in the (t+ 1)-th global iteration (a.k.a. round).
The aggregation in the FedAvg framework [2] is given by
wt+1 =
K∑
k=1
nk
n
wkt+1, (1)
where wt+1 represents the global model weight update (i.e., the aggregated model weight update),
and n denotes the total number of data points at K clients and we have
∑K
k=1 nk = n.
We propose to replace term nkn in Eq. (1) with α
k
t+1, which may differ in different rounds:
wt+1 =
K∑
k=1
αkt+1w
k
t+1. (2)
2
Given the anomaly score Akt+1 is assigned to client k in round t+ 1, the credit score α
k
t+1 of client k
in round t+ 1 is defined as
αkt+1 =
nk
(
Akt+1
)−L∑K
j=1 nj
(
Ajt+1
)−L , ∀j = 1, 2, · · · ,K, (3)
In addition to the fraction of training data points owned by a client, the credit score αkt+1 takes the
anomaly score into consideration, leading to targeted defense against abnormal clients. The constant
L in Eq. (3) is a hyperparameter, for tuning the influence of Akt+1 in calculating α
k
t+1. The value
of L should be large if one of the clients owns a large proportion of data. Note that, the anomaly
score Akt+1 can be calculated by various anomaly detection models [23]. In this paper, we present an
autoencoder-based anomaly detection [24], while leaving other anomaly detection schemes to the full
version of this work.
Note that since
∑K
k=1 α
k
t+1 = 1, the convergence of the proposed iterative model averaging procedure
in Eq. (2) is guaranteed as long as the convergence of the FedAvg algorithm in Eq. (1) is ensured.
This is because it essentially scales down the learning rate.
3.3 Autoencoder-Based Anomaly Detection
In the proposed approach, we employ a pre-trained autoencoder model at the server to detect abnormal
model weight updates from the clients and hence to detect anomalous clients. Autoencoder model is
known to be effective for anomaly detection [23], especially for high-dimensional data [24].
Denote D = {w1−1, w2−1, · · ·wN−1} as the set of model weights for training the autoencoder model,
where subscript −1 indicates that these model weights are accumulated at the server before the time
point for conducting anomaly detection. An autoencoder model can then be pre-trained with this
dataset D. In the training process, a data point wi−1 is firstly compressed into a lower dimensional
latent vector by the encoder network and then reconstructed as w˜i−1 by the decoder network [24].
The reconstruction error (a.k.a. mean squared error (MSE)) of the i-th data point is given by
Err (wi−1) = ‖ wi−1 − w˜i−1 ‖
2
. (4)
We can then define anomaly score Akt+1 of client k in round t+ 1 as
Akt+1 =
1 + Err (wkt+1)
1 + σt+1
, (5)
where σt+1 is defined as σt+1 = minj
{
Err (wjt+1), j = 1, 2, · · · ,K
}
.
For deep learning models, the dimension of the model weight wkt+1 can be extremely large, which
may lead to prohibitive computational complexity for training the autoencoder model and for anomaly
detection. To reduce the computational complexity, we apply dimensionality reduction to the model
weight wkt+1 to generate low-dimensional surrogates and use them as input to the autoencoder model.
We may apply several existing dimensionality reduction techniques here [25]. For instance, when the
dimension of the model weight wkt+1 is M , we may randomly take M out of M elements from w
k
t+1
to form a surrogate vector [26], with M being much smaller than M . For a specific neural network
model, we may take the weight of a particular layer from the model weight wkt+1, e.g., the weights of
the last convolutional layer [27].
After obtaining the anomaly scores of the clients, we can proceed to calculate the credit scores as in
Eq. (3) and run the aggregation operation. We may further make hard decisions on which clients are
abnormal via thresholding, which essentially follows the same procedure as for binary classification.
The credit score αkt+1 is set to zero if the anomaly score A
k
t+1 is strictly larger than the threshold
Atht+1; and α
k
t+1 is set to
nk
n otherwise. The threshold A
th
t+1 can be chosen as, e.g., the average value
or the median of the anomaly scores
{
Akt+1, j = 1, 2, · · · ,K
}
.
3
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Settings
We evaluate our solution with a 62-class image classification task over Federated Extended MNIST
(FEMNIST) dataset [28]. There are in total 801, 074 samples distributed unevenly among 3, 500
writers in FEMNIST. Each writer has an average of 229 samples with standard deviation 89.6. Similar
to [8, 28], each writer in the FEMNIST dataset represents a client, resulting in a heterogeneous
federated setting. During each global round, K = 20 writers will be selected and run mini-batch
gradient descent locally with a batch size of 16 and a learning rate of 0.06. Each client performs
local model weight update for 20 epochs. The percentage of abnormal clients is set to be 30% in
every global round. The anomaly score is defined by equation 5 and the credit score is defined by
equation 3. In "Credit Score" approach, we aggregate the clients’ model weights by equation 2. In
"Thresholding" approach, we set the threshold value to be the average value of the anomaly scores.
The image classification model trained in federated learning is a CNN model with two convolutional
layers, both with 3× 3 kernel, 32 channels, and 2× 2 max-pooling, followed by a fully connected
layer with 1024 units, and a final 62-dimensional softmax output layer. ReLu activation is used in the
hidden layers. This model has a similar architecture as LeNet-5 [29].
The autoencoder model used at the server for anomaly detection has four hidden layers. The input of
the autoencoder is a vector with dimensionality of 3000 randomly taken from the last convolutional
layer and the number of units in each hidden layer is 64, 32, 32, 64, respectively. ReLu activation is
used in the hidden layers. The autoencoder model is trained with accumulated local model weight
updates at the server, with the loss function being reconstruction error (i.e., MSE), a batch size of 32
and a dropout rate of 0.2. For calculating credit score, the hyperparameter L in Eq. (3) is set to 2.
4.2 Experimental Results
Following [17] and [30], we consider three adversarial attack models, namely sign-flipping, additive
noise and gradient ascent. Sign-flipping attack flips the sign of the model weight, and additive noise
attack adds Gaussian noise to the model weight. In gradient ascent attack, the anomalous clients run
gradient ascent locally, instead of gradient descent.
As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed methods ("Thresholding" and "Credit Score") outperform the
baseline schemes in terms of model accuracy in all settings. It is interesting to see that, by taking out
the abnormal updates (i.e., "Thresholding"), the proposed detection-based approach achieves almost
the same performance as the FedAvg algorithm without attackers. While GeoMed [16] performs the
best among the defense-based methods, the proposed detection-based approach has an improvement
of 10% or more in model accuracy over GeoMed under sign-flipping attacks, as illustrated in Fig. 1(a).
Further, as discussed in [17], GeoMed cannot defend against the large values sent by abnormal clients.
Krum [17] does not perform well in defending against the considered attacks because it is not
applicable in federated learning, where data is not identically and independently distributed (iid).
Only selecting one most appropriate local model weight update among all the updates received from
the clients leads to high bias in model aggregation in non-iid federated settings. Similarly, Trimmed
Mean [18] is not effective in defending against the considered attacks in non-iid federated settings.
Further, Trimmed Mean and Krum require the knowledge of the fraction of the attackers, which can
not be known apriori in federated learning.
Figure 1: Model performance under sign-flipping (a), additive noise (b), gradient ascent (c) attacks
4
5 Summary
We have shown that autoencoder based anomaly detection can be adopted at the server to detect
abnormal local model weight updates from the clients in a federated learning system. The detection-
based approach offers the option to opt-out the anomalous clients. Experimental results demonstrate
superior performance of the proposed detection-based approach over the defense-based methods.
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